What is the largest level of education that can be chosen by workers with productivity H in equilibrium in this model?

a) Argue that in the competitive market, a wage paid to a worker equals to his expected productivity (conditional on all the information about this worker known to rms).

b) What is the dierence between separating and pooling equilibria in this model? Find the separating equilibrium with the lowest possible education level for the high type.

c) What is the largest level of education that can be chosen by workers with productivity H in equilibrium in this model?

d) Find a pooling equilibrium in this model.

e) Suppose the equilibrium that you found in b) is played. The government comes up with a bill that prohibits wage discrimination based on education (i.e. holding other publicly observable workers` characteristics the same, rms can not oer dierent wages to people with dierent education levels). To pass the bill, the government holds a referendum in which only workers can vote. Assuming that voters vote sincerely, i.e. voters pick an alternative that gives them the highest payo, and that a simple majority is required for passing the bill, derive a necessary and sucient condition for passing this bill (the condition must be formulated in terms of fundamentals of the model)

Question 2. Firm A (the acquirer") is considering taking over rm T (the arget"). It does not know rm T`s value, it believes that this value, when rm T is controlled by its own management, is at least $0 and at most $100, and assigns equal probability to each of the 101 dollar values in this range. Firm T will be worth 50% more under rm A`s management than it is under its own manage ment. Suppose that rm A bids y to take over rm T, and rm T is worth x (under its own management). Then if T accepts A`s oer, A`s payo is 3/2x - y and T`s payo is y, if T rejects A`s oer, A`s payo is 0 and T`s payo is x:

Model this situation as a Bayesian game in which rm A chooses how much to oer and rm T decides the lowest oer to accept. Find the Nash equilibria of this game. Explain why the logic behind the equilibrium is called adverse selection.